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BOOK REVIEW
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. John Lord O'Brian. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955. Pp. 84. $2.00.
The steady erosion in the cause of national security of our constitutionally
guaranteed civil rights during the past decade ranks as one of the frightening
phenomena of our time. Alarmed by charges and disclosures of Communist
infiltration in the federal government, the American citizen virtually acquiesced
in a succession of individual Congressional acts and executive orders which, read
together, foreshadow far-reaching changes in our traditional legal philosophy,
constitutional theory, and attitudes toward our governmental institutions. Allowed
to proceed unchallenged, this trend might well result in a permanent reorientation
of the relationship between the state and the individual in this country.
In the Godkin lectures delivered at Harvard last Spring, John Lord O'Brian,
the distinguished American attorney, turned to the pressing problem of striking a
balance between the admitted need for security devices against Communist threats
on the one hand and the preservation of our historic civil liberties on the other.
In these lectures, now published by Harvard University Press under the title
National Security and Individual Freedom, he analyzes the nature of these encroach-
ments against our civil liberties, their implications, and how and why the American
people permitted them to occur. The book goes beyond a mere recital of incidents.
Instead, it seeks to evaluate them in broad historical perspective. This book is no
jeremiad. It is a rational study of cause and effect and a call to action.
The American people's immediate legacy from the last war was a profound
sense of anxiety, the product of an unfulfilled peace, the threat of Communist
aggression, the potential of atomic warfare, and the awareness of new dimensions
of human brutality as practiced by totalitarian states. This resulted in a drive for
personal and national security, to be achieved regardless of its immediate cost or
of the eventual implications of the measures used. At the exposure of both real
and fancied Communist infiltration in government, the American people were
confused and fearful. These fears were skillfully exploited by unscrupulous political
opportunists. In this charged atmosphere of emotionalism and intellectual con-
fusion, the "remedy" was a steady succession of measures limiting civil liberties in
the name of security. In retrospect, it is ironical that measures designed to increase
national security resulted, instead, in further anxiety, doubt and distrust, and
interfered with maximum national effectiveness during a period of international
stress. Moreover, time proved the remedy as dangerous, if not possibly worse,
than the illness it sought to cure. These measures were the McCarran Immigration
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Act, President Truman's Loyalty Order, the Internal Security Act, and President
Eisenhower's Federal Security Program. 1
In these, Mr. O'Brian perceives both a new legal philosophy and new pro-
cedural practices to implement and administer it which form "a coherent
pattern for a legal system quite opposite from the distinctive features of our tra-
dition of fair play as well as American Constitutionalism." These measures estab-
lish . . . something like a new system of preventive law applicable to the field of
ideas."
Traditionally, Anglo-American jurisprudence has refused to act upon con-
jecture and suspicion in order to prevent the possibility of an unlawful act. Only
after the commission of an overt act of illegality may punitive action be taken.
In contrast, recent security statutes and executive orders establish a system of
preventive law applicable to the communication of political ideas. Mr. O'Brian
points out:
. . . preventive remedies against unorthodox political ideas have been
increasingly imposed on the theory that unless such preventive action is
taken, the communication of such ideas will be the direct cause of acts
which are wrongful in themselves.' 2
Preventive law gave rise to the concept of imputing guilt because of
association. Under this concept men are found "untrustworthy," not because of
wrongful acts, but because of their ideas, of motives attributed to them, and even
1. Together with new interpretations of the Smith Act.
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in his very recent book A
Democrat Looks At His Party, refers to charges made by the government of a
person's disloyalty "on the basis of evidence of which he is not told, received from
persons whom he is not allowed to confront, and of which only an anonymous
summary is given to his judges" and acknowledges a "grave mistake" in the
Executive Order instituting the federal loyalty program.
"These practices had their root in the President's Executive Order, 9835,
of March 21, 1947. This order and the Act of August 26, 1950, upon which rests
the present Executive Order, 10450, of April 27, 1953, were adopted under a
Democratic Administration. I was an officer of that Administration and share
with it the responsibility for what I am now convinced was a grave mistake and
a failure to foresee consequences which were inevitable . . . The President be-
lieved that his Executive Order could and would be carried out with fairness and
restraint, that, as he said, 'loyal government employees should be protected against
accusations which were false, malicious or ill-founded.' But his expectations
were not fulfilled by the multitudinous administrators of the loyalty program,
pressed, as they were, by the emotions generated by the reckless political attack on
the Administration. Furthermore, it was not realized at first how dangerous
was the practice of secret evidence and secret informers, how alien to all our con-
ceptions of justice and the rights of the citizen, even though he was also an em-
ployee." (Emphasis added.)
2. Although preventive action against the communication of ideas up to now
has been taken only against groups, the Internal Security Act of 1950 authorizes
imprisonment of an individual citizen because of "suspected intentions."
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"suspicion as to their future conduct." Mr. O'Brian asserts that the use of the
Attorney General's list of alleged subversive organizations is the best illustration
of such governmental pressures "in the direction of thought control. ' 3 He even
asks "whether in practice this list does not operate as a bill of attainder."
These new concepts were implemented by procedural innovations, many of
which deny critical Constitutional safeguards. Of these Mr. O'Brian states:
It is in the procedures established for the enforcement of these
statutes and orders that the most serious questions are arising affecting
individual freedom and the present political status of the citizen in the
American polity.
An early procedural aberration was the empowering of administrative agencies
and officials, rather than the judiciary, to pass judgment upon the personal beliefs
and associations of a private citizen employed or seeking employment in the
government. Mr. O'Brian strenuously condemns these agencies. He decries the
lack of competence of some of their members, and their lack of knowledge or
regard for Constitutional guarantees, which are treated "merely as rules of thumb"
to be freely set aside in the interest of expediency."4 In this, the most vigorous
part of the book, Justice Brandeis is aptly quoted to the effect that "the greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding." There is further warning of "the subtle and insidious
way in which what appear to be slight aberrations of procedure grow into major
invasions of Constitutional freedom."
Reviewing these encroachments, Mr. O'Brian does not necessarily advocate
the abolition of security programs. He does advocate a "drastic revision by men
soundly educated in the history of freedom and in the history of constitutionalism,"
and that the program be keyed to the actual internal threat from Communism,
which has diminished steadily. He asks whether this danger now cannot be met
3. Compare the statement by Judge Learned Hand: "I believe that that
community is already in process of dissolution where each man begins to eye
his neighbor as a possible enemy, where non-conformity with the accepted creed,
political as well as religious, is a mark of disaffection; where denunciation, with-
out specification or backing takes the place of evidence; where orthodoxy chokes
freedom of dissent; where laith in the eventual supremacy of reason has become
so timid that we dare not enter our convictions in the open lists to win or lose.
Such fears as these are a solvent which can eat out the cement that binds the
stones together; they may in the end subject us to a despotism as evil as any
that we dread." (Excerpt from the speech of Judge Learned Hand at the Uni-
versity of the State of New York, October 24, 1952; reprinted In The New York,
Times of January 21, 1953.)
4. This basic departure was followed by the use of information from secret
informers whose competence was unknown even to the hearing officers, to the
resulting denial of cross-examination, the use of paid informants and the denial of
judicial review of agency decisions. See Note 1, Supra.
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adequately by "traditional procedures consonant with the constitutional guarantees."
Needed revisions, however, will come about only in response to public
demand. Mr. O'Brian states that no dear-cut demand has been felt, because the
public has been needlessly confused by an issue presented in terms of the com-
plexities of legal philosophy and procedure. He suggests that this problem of
restrictions on the right to speak, think and criticize be presented in the form of
a moral issue which the public has a demonstrated competence to resolve.5
"Although there are always present latent forces of political bigotry
and intolerance, there are also present powerful and assertive elements of
moral leadership. But the reaction will not come until disinterested
leaders of public opinion, and presumably educators, assume the unpop-
ular burden of resenting the current encroachments upon civil liberty and,
more important, provide constructive suggestions for such changes in
administrative policy as will restore the confidence and independence of
the individual and strengthen once again his faith in the liberties guaran-
teed him by the Constitution."
Not a little of the significance of this book derives from the personality and
background of the writer. Mr. O'Brian, a man of wisdom and integrity, is neither
the unworldly intellectual nor the professional crusader, but a practicing attorney
at the summit of a truly outstanding public and private career. His warnings are
not the cliches of the doctrinaire liberal, but the thoughtful deductions of one
accustomed to dealing with affairs of substance in law and public affairs. If the
reviewer may use the word "conservative" in its finest sense, it is this conservatism,
together with the high caliber of the writer's observations, which lends so much
weight to his words.
Mr. O'Brian may well be termed one of those "leaders" whom he calls upon
to "awaken to their obligation to protect the freedom of the human spirit." This
book is one manifestation of the "uprising of the public conscience."
PAuL D. LAGOmARCINO
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Buffalo School of Law
5. As; for example, the defeat, because of moral resentment by the mass of
the people, of President Roosevelt's "court-packing" bill of 1937 and, more recent-
ly, the enthusiasm of the public for the decision of the Supreme Court condemn-
ing the seizure of the steel plants by President Truman.
